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REMEMBERING NYERERE: POLITICAL
RHETORIC AND DISSENT IN
CONTEMPORARY TANZANIA
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ABSTRACT
This article examines the changing uses of political rhetoric around the
burial of Julius Nyerere in 1999. It argues that the ruling party uses rhet-
oric as a means of ‘soft power’, but also documents how this rhetoric,
though geared towards legitimizing Nyerere’s successors, employed
tropes that were rejected by some people and were used by others to cri-
tique leaders who were perceived to lack the selﬂess integrity attributed
to Nyerere. The article compares funerary songs by a government-spon-
sored band, popular at the time of Nyerere’s death, with memories of
Nyerere in rural areas in the early to mid-2000s. While the image of
Nyerere in the funeral songs as a benign family patriarch writ large still
persists, it coexists with strongly divergent constructions of Nyerere as an
authoritarian ruler or a self-seeking proﬁteer. Moreover, the ‘ofﬁcial’,
benign Nyerere has been employed not only by government and party
faithful, but also by striking workers, opposition politicians, and critical
newspapers as a measure of the shortcomings of his successors. The in-
vocation of Nyerere as a paragon of an endangered ideal of virtue in
public ofﬁce indicates widespread anxieties towards a state that often dis-
appoints but occasionally delivers, in unpredictable turns, and the limits
of the government’s ability to shut down dissent.
THIS ARTICLE IS AN EXAMINATION of the views and attitudes expressed
around the death in 1999 of Tanzania’s ﬁrst President, Julius Nyerere,
and the memories of Nyerere in rural areas in the early to mid-2000s. It
draws on interviews, informal conversations, and newspapers from the
thirteen years since his death to analyse two phenomena.1 One is the pro-
motion by ofﬁcials, and by state and private media, of a particular
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pointing me towards MwanaHalisi and Raia Mwena and providing a copy of the cartoon, and
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1. The ﬁve interviews referred to in more detail below form part of a collection of about
400 interviews, many of which mentioned Nyerere in passing. I chose this subset because it
dealt most explicitly with Nyerere’s policies as President.
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interpretation of Nyerere’s life and legacy. Tanzania’s ruling ‘Party of the
Revolution’ or Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) made a well-prepared
attempt to claim his memory before his body had even returned to the
country from the London hospital where he had sought treatment for his
ﬁnal illness. The focus of the ofﬁcial presentation of the former President
is summarized in the title of one of the commemorative songs which a
CCM-sponsored band put out as soon as his death was announced: Lulu
ya amani, ‘The pearl of peace’. During the weeks after Nyerere’s death,
the heritage of peaceful societal relations that he was said to have
bestowed on Tanzania – and of which the CCM claims to be the endur-
ing guarantor – became the focus of a sustained media campaign charac-
terized by discreet cooperation between state and non-state actors.2 The
ruling party has consistently returned to this vision ever since.
The second focus of this article is the limited reach and varied uses of
this rhetoric, and what it can tell us about the dynamics of state–society
relations in Tanzania.3 Its use by CCM may appear an obvious political
ritual, merely afﬁrming the party’s rarely challenged dominance. The fol-
lowing pages, though, start from the proposition that notwithstanding
this dominance, agents of the Tanzanian government manage their state’s
relative weakness partly by actively seeking and building consensus
among the governed. The governed, conversely, produce interpretations
of Tanzania’s politics that diverge signiﬁcantly from ofﬁcial ones. In par-
ticular, they evoke Nyerere as the embodiment of civic virtue in public
ofﬁce to criticize the perceived lack of the same qualities in his successors.
Thus some observers were openly dismissive of the benign patriarchal
role attributed to Nyerere in many ofﬁcial and private statements at the
2. Press coverage of Nyerere during the month following his death is assembled at <http://
www.juliusnyerere.info/index.php/resources/news/press_coverage_from_the_internet_on_
nyereres_death/> (11 December 2012). Although this website is clearly pro-Nyerere and so
is much of the press coverage, it includes some critical comment, mainly from abroad (for
an example, see the obituary from The Economist).
3. One telling aspect of these media images that cannot be fully discussed here for reasons
of space is the religious language deployed, which arguably was carefully tailored to sidestep
religious tensions in Tanzania at the time, both within Catholicism (Nyerere’s afﬁliation) and
between Christians and Muslims. Islamist criticism of Nyerere merits its own article and is
not included here. On religion in Tanzanian politics, see David Westerlund, Ujamaa na
Dini: A study of some aspects of society and religion in Tanzania, 1961–1977 (Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, Stockholm, 1980); on invective against Nyerere as anti-Muslim see
Mohamed Said, The Life and Times of Abdulwaheed Sykes (1924–68): The untold story of the
Muslim struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika (Minerva Press, London, 1998); on
his role in the Zanzibari revolution, execrated by Islamists, see Sauda Sheikh Barwani et al.,
Unser Leben vor der Revolution und Danach: Maisha yetu kabla ya mapinduzi na baadaye
(Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, Köln, 2003); on tensions among Tanzanian Catholics that extended
into Nyerere’s family, see Panafrican News Agency, ‘Nyerere’s daughter denied holy com-
munion’, 20 October 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199910200075.html> (12
December 2012).
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time, and even where observers operated within the frame of reference set
by ofﬁcial rhetoric, there were tensions within and between ofﬁcial and
popular views of Nyerere’s legacy. At ﬁrst sight, the notion of Nyerere as
the founder of a peaceful, consciously non-violent polity appears to sit
quite well with another description of him that quickly became ubiquitous
in Dar es Salaam during the preparations for his funeral, and has persisted
since: Nyerere the mbabe wa wanyonge, the ‘champion of the downtrodden’
(wanyonge denotes both monetary poverty and a lack of social status and
connections; mbabe is ‘lord, strong patron, strongman’). This memory is
easily derived from the notion of Nyerere as a family patriarch writ large.
Nevertheless, the two descriptions of Nyerere have potentially conﬂicting
implications. For CCM ofﬁcialdom, the invocation of Nyerere as the cham-
pion of peace serves as a potential legitimization for crackdowns on dissent:
the message is ‘Don’t rock the boat; do not squander Nyerere’s peaceful
heritage’. Conversely, the notion of Nyerere the champion of the downtrod-
den can also be used to legitimize dissent against perceived social injustice,
allowing non-elite citizens to invoke Nyerere against CCM grandees.
Ofﬁcial efforts to exploit Nyerere for consensus building show an arguably
under-studied facet of politics in Africa at large, and Tanzania in particular:
the use of persuasion, and more speciﬁcally, of relatively discreet persuasion,
by politicians. Persuasion, or the use of rhetoric, ampliﬁed through mass
media, by government representatives or sympathizers to create broad-based
consensus, is recognized as a core element of politics in states where elec-
tions decide political fortunes.4 Given the autocratic nature of many post-
colonial political regimes in Africa, it has been less frequently explored in
this context; the focus has instead been on political networks and patronage.5
Where persuasion is recognized as a factor in African politics, most often in
the form of ‘performative’ politics, it is often heavy-handed, and geared
towards the political advantage or survival of individual autocratic rulers:
Mobutu’s self-styling or the celebrations surrounding Robert Mugabe come
to mind.6 Funerals have also been known to be manipulated in this way.7
4. See Michael D. Cobb and James E. Kuklinski, ‘Changing minds: political arguments
and political persuasion’, American Journal of Political Science 41, 1 (1997), pp. 88–121;
Richard Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and attitudes in the twenty-ﬁrst
century (Taylor and Francis, London, 2003).
5. For example, see Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa (Longman, London, 1993);
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (University of California
Press, Berkeley, CA, 1982).
6. For a general characterization of this style of politics, see Jean-François Bayart, ‘Africa
and the world: a history of extraversion’, African Affairs 99, 395 (2000), pp. 217–67. For a
careful examination of a more collectivist, but still strongly hierarchical, form of political
theatre in an East African context, see Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics in Modern
Kenya (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993).
7. Florence Bernault, ‘Colonial bones: the 2006 burial of Savorgnan de Brazza’, African
Affairs 109, 436 (2010), pp. 369–90.
REMEMBERING NYERERE 3
 at :: on A
ugust 7, 2013
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Tanzania was undeniably autocratic for much of its post-colonial
history, governed between 1964 and 1992 by a one-party state that
deployed widespread coercion in its rural resettlement campaign (‘villa-
gization’) and attempted transition to ‘African socialism’ (ujamaa)
between 1968 and about 1986. Following the ofﬁcial end of this phase of
state interventionism, observers have attributed the resilience of social
order during the era of political liberalization and structural adjustment
predominantly to non-state actors.8 Given this, and the fact that the
CCM has remained dominant despite the reintroduction of multi-
partyism, one might think that the government does not have much work
to do to create consensus.
The present discussion, by contrast, takes cues from Catherine Boone’s
insistence that post-colonial African governments have actively to manage
relations with local, often informal power brokers, and with wider
publics.9 Boone demonstrates that the same government may use very
diverse strategies in different regions. Arguably, similar variations can
occur over time and between contexts, as well as over space. Taking off
from this insight, this article examines the different ways that Nyerere’s
memory has been constructed as a case study of the way that political per-
suasion has been used in Tanzania alongside more authoritarian methods
of political control. In a sense, ruling politicians’ persistent invocation of
Nyerere’s legacy indicates that despite the relative quiescence of
Tanzanian politics, they do not take their audience for granted.10
At the same time, the failure of the ‘ofﬁcial’ version of Nyerere to dom-
inate the conversation exclusively offers openings to trace political atti-
tudes among ‘non-elite’ Tanzanians. This description covers a very
diverse population, in which the levels of marginality are very ﬁnely
graded. This article focuses on an aspect of popular political discourse
that is salient across this spectrum: the tendency to deplore the decline of
civic virtue in public ofﬁce from the end of Nyerere’s reign onwards,
while reafﬁrming the essential role of the state in society, above all in the
interest of the weak.
With pronounced moralist overtones, this way of pressing claims on the
state can sound naïve and anachronistic. In this regard it resonates with
8. Aili Mari Tripp, Changing the Rules: The politics of liberalisation and the urban economy in
Tanzania (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997); Bruce Heilman and Paul Kaiser,
‘Religion, identity and politics in Tanzania’, Third World Quarterly 23, 4 (2002), pp. 691–
709. An increase in social and political conﬂict has been warned of repeatedly, but so far has
not been realized: Paul Kaiser, ‘Structural adjustment and the fragile nation’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 34, 2 (1996), pp. 227–37.
9. Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial authority and insti-
tutional choice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
10. This is not to suggest that there was no dissension within CCM and government. For
factionalism in the 1980s and 1990s, see Tripp, Changing the Rules, Chapter 4.
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the proposition, made most explicitly by Goran Hyden, that pre-capitalist
(‘pre-modern’) forms of political and economic reasoning coexist with the
formal (‘modern’) institutions of government in Tanzania and shape their
actions.11 There are two competing uses of the positive image of Nyerere
at work here: he is either a patriarchal precursor validating the current
government, or a paragon of public virtue highlighting the shortcomings
of his successors. In as much as both of these uses implicitly afﬁrm
Nyerere as a benign patriarchal ﬁgure they resonate with the concept of
‘economy of affection’ that Hyden employed to summarize his under-
standing of Tanzanian society as being predominantly ‘pre-capitalist’ and
organized according to an informal moral economy.12
Closer examination of the rhetoric around Nyerere, however, shows
that rather than being a mere holdover from a more communal past, the
moral and familial terms described here are partly a product of the sphere
of formal government, and of its efforts to accommodate international
policy prescriptions with their emphasis on ‘good governance’. They also
reﬂect Tanzanians’ concrete present-day experience of a state that often
disappoints but occasionally delivers, in unpredictable turns, and to
which anyway there is no alternative. In this regard, the present study ela-
borates on James Giblin’s insistence that the ‘idiom of kinship’ has always
been political and has come to be used in post-colonial Tanzania to cri-
tique those in power.13 In line with Priya Lal’s recent re-examination of
villagization, it ﬁnds a polyphony of elaborations on the ofﬁcial terms of
politics produced by people marginal to the making of policy.14 In conse-
quence, it also shows that the use of ‘big-man’ imagery in African politics
does not always succeed in dampening down dissent.15
The ‘ofﬁcial’ Nyerere and his observers
Julius Nyerere left Tanzania in early September 1999 to seek treatment at
St Thomas’s hospital in London for leukaemia or, as Tanzanian media
put it, kansa ya damu (cancer of the blood). He died in this hospital on
14 October. His body was repatriated to Tanzania and lay in state in a
11. Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an uncaptured peas-
antry (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1981).
12. Hyden’s ‘economy of affection’ is a kindred spirit of the ‘moral ethnicity’ described in
Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conﬂict in Kenya and Africa (James
Currey, Oxford, 1992), Volume 2, chapters 11–12.
13. James Giblin, A History of the Excluded: Making family a refuge from state in twentieth-
century Tanzania (James Currey, Oxford, 2006).
14. Priya Lal, ‘Self-reliance and the state: the multiple meanings of development in early
post-colonial Tanzania’, Africa 82, 2 (2012), pp. 212–34.
15. Here Tanzania appears to differ from the DRC; compare with Michael Schatzberg,
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, family, food (Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, IN, 2001).
REMEMBERING NYERERE 5
 at :: on A
ugust 7, 2013
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
cofﬁn with a plexi-glass window. Tanzanians queued up for hours for the
opportunity to walk past. Subsequently, the body was taken to Nyerere’s
home village of Butiama in the Lake Victoria region for burial. During his
illness his health had been a regular topic on national news. His death
was announced in a speech by his successor Benjamin Mkapa, much
repeated over the following days. It set the tone for the heavy focus on
unity in the ofﬁcial interpretation of Nyerere, with Mkapa imploring his
fellow citizens to believe that the foundation of unity the deceased had
laid was strong enough to hold beyond his death.16
Led by the Prime Minister, and making use of the country’s interven-
tionist media laws, the government also declared a period of national
mourning and suspended regular broadcasting.17 The state TV channel
switched to a solid diet of Nyerere footage, partly taken from his life, and
partly from the ongoing funerary process. Private broadcasters followed
the lead: one of them covered a live ‘wake’ held by the popular musician
Remmy Ongala. Sitting on the ﬂoor of a darkened room in what was pre-
sumably his own home, in a shirt and loincloth with his legs outstretched
before him, Remmy gently shook his dreadlocked head and hummed a
tune.18 In this way he exactly recreated the subdued atmosphere of a
house in mourning. By most standards, this was poor TV, but clearly the
Tanzanian broadcaster felt it worked, as Ongala’s wake was broadcast for
days.19
Meanwhile the popular CCM-backed band, Tanzania One Theatre
(TOT), led by the singer Captain Komba, produced three funeral songs,
audiotapes of which appeared on the streets in apparently unlimited
numbers within hours of the death being announced.20 The same tunes
came from every one of the wooden carts selling music on street corners.
One of these songs was ‘Pearl of peace’; the others were entitled Buriani
Mwalimu, ‘Rest in peace, Teacher’, and Awamu ya kwanza, ‘The ﬁrst
era’. During the weeks following Nyerere’s death, the obituary songs by
16. Benjamin Mkapa, ‘Presidential address’, 15 October 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/474919.stm> (17 December 2012).
17. On media law, see Kelly Askew and John Francis Kitime, ‘Popular music censorship
in Tanzania’, in Michael Drewett and Martin Cloonan (eds), Popular Music Censorship in
Africa (Ashgate, London, 2006), and Martin Sturmer, The Media History of Tanzania
(Ndanda Mission Press, Ndanda,1998).
18. On public perceptions of Remmy Ongala, see Werner Graebner, ‘Whose music? The
songs of Remmy Ongala and Orchestra Super Matimila’, Popular Music 8, 3 (1989),
pp. 243–58.
19. Remmy Ongala, who died in the late 2000s, was, at least until his conversion to born-
again Christianity around 2004, a very popular ﬁgure who gave his name to a daladala route
taxi stop in his neighbourhood, Sinza (‘kwa Remmy’).
20. For the intricate personal and professional connections between TOT, Captain
Komba, and CCM, see Laura Edmondson, Performance and Politics in Tanzania: The nation
on stage (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 2007).
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Captain Komba and TOT became by far the most salient commentary on
the meanings of Nyerere’s life and death. They deserve to be quoted at
length.
Buriani Mwalimu ‘Rest in peace, Teacher’
Ndugu Watanzania Fellow Tanzanians
Sasa yametimia Now it has come to pass
Yamealikwa na mwenyezi Mungu It has been ordained by the almighty God
Aliye[inaudible] na kipenzi ya
watu
He who [inaudible] and the love of the people
Mwalimu Nyerere sasa ametuaga Teacher Nyerere has bid us goodbye
Ndugu Watanzania Fellow Tanzanians
Tumebaki yatima We have remained behind as orphans
Ndugu Watanzania Fellow Tanzanians
Sasa tufanye nini Now what shall we do?
Tudumishe amani Let us perpetuate the peace
Aliyeyogombania That he [Nyerere] fought for
Nguzo wa umoja na utulivu Pillar of unity and calm
Dunia haitakusahau daima The world will never forget you
This song was the one most widely heard during the weeks after
Nyerere’s death. In keeping with common ways of speaking about death,
it evokes God’s will before Nyerere has even been mentioned by name.
It also brackets Nyerere the guarantor of peace with Nyerere the patriarch,
the quasi-parent (whose death ‘orphans’ Tanzanians).
Leo tunaagana na rafiki yetu Today we say goodbye to our friend
Mwenzetu, ndugu yetu One of ours, our relative
Mwalimu Nyerere Teacher Nyerere
Taifa linahuzunika The country is saddened
Afrika yahuzunika Africa is saddened
Dunia yahuzunika The world is saddened
Pamoja twasema kwa heri Together we say goodbye
Kwa heri mwalimu… Goodbye teacher…
Sasa tuende wapi tukapate
ushauri…
Now where shall we go for advice…
Ulitutoka wakati twakuhitaji… You left us at a time when we needed you…
Eee, Mungu umpokee mtumishi
wako
Eee, God receive your servant
Again, Nyerere is spoken of as a family member and elder: a source of
advice. Moreover, the transition from ‘the country’ to ‘the world’
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emphasizes his global standing, suggesting that even in death he had the
ability to turn the eyes of the world upon Tanzania.
Lulu ya amani ‘The pearl of peace’
Lulu ya zamani ya amani The pearl of old of peace
Imejificha wapi tutafute Where has it hidden itself, let us search
Lulu ya zamani ya upendo The pearl of old of love
Imejificha wapi tutafute Where has it hidden itself, let us search
Amani imetoweka Afrika Peace has disappeared from Africa
Amani imetoweka dunia Peace has disappeared from the world
Tanzania imejichimbia In Tanzania it has made itself at home.
Here, Tanzania is set in a global comparison and its political stability
identiﬁed as an asset any nation would cherish. Although this ‘peace’ is
not explicitly attributed to Nyerere’s good works, the association of the
song with the rest of the audiotape’s content drives home the point:
Nyerere has bequeathed peace to Tanzania, which is a source of national
pride.
The songs were very carefully tailored to popular tastes. They were an
exact rendering of the musical style known in Tanzania as ‘kwaya’ from
the English word ‘choir’: the soloist’s voice is answered by a women’s
choir in close harmony. The origins of this style lie in church music, but
it was among the ﬁrst to become widely available commercially. It is very
‘local’ to Tanzanians, but does not ﬁt clearly into a roster of traditional vs
modern.
The songs also persistently position Nyerere as a ‘man of the people’ –
‘one of us’, a relative and friend, whose death affects all Tanzanians per-
sonally as well as collectively. At the same time, and without any apparent
sense of contradiction, they elevate Nyerere to a heroic and indeed saintly
status: he has ‘gained us respect’, he is ‘a pillar of unity and peace’ a
source of advice as well as pride, and a servant of God.21 Together, these
songs are strong evidence of the CCM leadership’s concern to transform
Nyerere into a source of civic pride and, above all, restfulness; of consen-
sus with their own stewardship of his political heritage.22
21. An explicit campaign to have Nyerere declared a saint has reportedly been under way
since 2006. See The New Sudan Vision, ‘Tanzania: Nyerere ﬁt to be a saint – Museveni’, 2
June 2009, <http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1717:tanzania-nyerere-ﬁt-to-be-a-saint-museveni&catid=9:arts-and-culture&Itemid=22>
(23 August 2011).
22. For CCM’s concerted efforts to assert control over TOT, see Edmonton, Performance
and Politics.
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Most of the Tanzanians I interacted with in 1999 received this message
positively, while also elaborating it beyond ofﬁcial meanings. At the time,
I lived in a household in central Dar es Salaam that contained ﬁve adults.
The household head was a medical doctor, while the other grown-ups
had varying levels of secondary education. Too cloistered for their own
liking, they treated the former President as a legitimate topic for conversa-
tions between chores. During his illness they asked questions such as
what exactly was blood cancer? Did he have any chance of survival? How
come the symptoms of his drawn-out illness, according to some rumours,
so much resembled those of AIDS? How were his children coping? Much
of this was ordinary gossip, with a hint of extra drama added by the polit-
ical and moral authority of the dying man. It conﬁrmed Nyerere’s import-
ance while also humanizing and banalizing him.
Together, the carefully put-together TV content and the way it was
integrated into everyday conversation had the effect of both enshrining
Nyerere’s death as a singular national event, and making it intelligible in
the same terms as the death of a neighbourhood notable. Perhaps the
most banal element in the media campaign, but also one that was very ef-
fective in showing how widely the death was noted, was the Nyerere
kanga cloth: in the national colours, with a smiling portrait of Nyerere
surrounded by the dates of his birth and death. As a women’s dress,
it became very visible for the remainder of the year. In quite a concrete
way, Tanzanians ‘owned’ Nyerere’s death.
An element of careful planning is evident in the prompt production of
‘themed merchandise’ (audiotapes and kangas), as well as the funerary
ceremonies and their broadcasting. It succeeded in minimizing any sense
of crisis and aided in spreading a particular understanding of Nyerere,
characterized by the equation of national politics with the small-scale,
personal interactions characteristic of families and neighbourhoods.23
International journalists commented on the genuine grief shown by many
‘ordinary’ Tanzanians.24 However, the people capable of getting to the
queue to see Nyerere’s cofﬁn, or of accessing Internet forums to express
23. In a sense, this is the opposite of the colonization of formal institutions by informal,
often kin-based networks that observers of African politics often comment on: a politician
who, by all accounts, kept politics and personal relationships separate, was reinvented as
everyone’s family member. For the personalization of African politics, see Patrick Chabal
and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a political instrument (Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, IN, 1999); Bayart, The State in Africa.
24. The Times (London), ‘Thousands ﬂock to see Nyerere’s cofﬁn’, p. 49, 19 October
1999, <http://www.juliusnyerere.info/images/uploads/nyerere_press_coverage_1999.pdf>
(23 August 2011); The Independent, ‘Tanzania weeps for father of the nation’, p. 52, 20 October
1999, <http://www.juliusnyerere.info/images/uploads/nyerere_press_covarage_1999.pdf>
(23 August 2011). For overwhelmingly positive views on Nyerere from East Africa, see BBC
Online, ‘Email tribute’, p. 40, 18 October 1999, <http://www.juliusnyerere.info/images/
uploads/nyerere_press_covarage_1999.pdf> (23 August 2011).
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their sense of loss, were not quite ‘ordinary’, as few Tanzanians at the
time enjoyed Internet access. Nevertheless, the intense public interest
and popular participation in Nyerere’s obsequies suggests that the ofﬁcial
representation ‘worked’ for many people in the country.
The obliging participation of the private media, including Remmy
Ongala whose wide popularity and relative economic security granted him
a degree of independence, highlights the ability of CCM ofﬁcialdom to
recruit support from beyond the state sector. For somebody like Ongala,
it need not have been merely about politics; his sympathies with Nyerere
are consistent with the focus on ‘ordinary people’ and their troubles in
his lyrics. A similar commonality of purpose between ofﬁcialdom and
the private sector, with a slightly more opportunistic bent, is evident also
in the background of a 2001 pamphlet on Nyerere’s funeral. With
Nyerere’s portrait superimposed on a scene from his funeral, the inclusive
message is: ‘Tanzania, we will remember you forever, father of the
nation. You have left us [rule of] law, unity, peace, love and cooperation’
(Figure 1).
Its author, Michael Mwakilasa, is a businessman who is not directly
involved in politics. In a 2009 newspaper proﬁle of his bio-fuel company,
he nevertheless stated that ‘people should stop blaming the government
[for their poverty] but work hard instead. The government should only
create an enabling environment for people to realize their full potential’ –
while also acknowledging that ‘the Ministry of Energy and Minerals sup-
ports me a lot’.25 He thus epitomizes the fact that part of the entrepre-
neurial middle class, rather than presenting an independent alternative to
state actors in the economy, is closely aligned with them.26
The voices immediately surrounding Nyerere’s death, then, suggest
that very diverse sets of people converged around the ofﬁcial representa-
tion of Nyerere as the originator of a peaceful political culture and pro-
tector of the weak. Yet while this image was supported by a groundswell
of popular sympathy and appreciation for the deceased, parts of it were
also very carefully put together and put about. Moreover, from the start
this narrative contained a number of different overtones – some tending
towards the egalitarian, some towards the authoritarian – that permitted
very different elaborations of Nyerere’s memory.
25. The Sunday Citizen, 10 May 2009, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/newo.php?id=12448>
(10 September 2012). For Mwakilasa’s participation in the Davos Economic Forum, 2010,
see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Ii4BSas_Qk> (18 December 2012).
26. On the rise of the African middle class, see Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains (Hurst and
Co., London, 2010).
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The limits of ofﬁcial representations: Nyerere the failed despot and Nyerere the
advantage-seeker
Meanwhile, very different perspectives on Nyerere are evident in inter-
views from the rural Lindi region. This part of the country has not done
well in the post-colonial period; its main export crop, cashew nuts, has
remained economically marginal and its education record is poor.27 Here,
Figure 1. Front cover of Michael Mwakilasa’s brochure (see main text for
translation). The photograph shows a scene from Nyerere’s funeral. With
permission of the author.
27. Berta Koda and Pekka Seppaelae, The Making of a Periphery (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet,
Uppsala, 1998).
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the inﬂuence of the ofﬁcial representations of Nyerere was clearly felt, yet
arguably the most revealing variations in the image of Nyerere were those
that could not easily be placed either within or in opposition to the ofﬁcial
Nyerere ‘paradigm’. Rather, the way that Nyerere was remembered in
Lindi revealed provincial people trying to think through his heritage in a
way that drew on ofﬁcial representations, but also on different, locally
relevant categories, and on ﬁrst-hand experience with his policies.28
Most often, the name Nyerere came up in connection with what were ar-
guably the biggest events in rural Tanzania in the second half of the twenti-
eth century: the independence campaign and villagization. Unsurprisingly,
the valency of these two events was very different. Respondents who
were young adults in the 1950s often spoke of that period with palpable
nostalgia.29 The personal impression Nyerere created touring the country
as the leader of the independence campaign was crucial in persuading his
audiences that independence was a viable project.30
For example, one man who had witnessed a speech by Nyerere in the
mid-1950s could still reproduce the content of that speech at some
length.31 How accurate his recollections are is another question, but they
certainly ﬁt with what we know of Nyerere’s rhetoric during the period,
focusing on the need for the English to ‘return the country’ to its inhabi-
tants peacefully. Similarly, when discussing the early post-independence
period, respondents sometimes made reference to one of Nyerere’s catch-
phrases without even explicitly attributing it to him, saying that Tanzania
then was in a state of ‘war against three enemies: poverty, illness, and
ignorance’.
Besides the war against poverty, illness, and ignorance, though, the
best-remembered Nyererean turn of phrase was one that was evoked with
a great deal of bitterness: his statement in 1973 that villagization was
sio ombi, ni amri, not a request, but an order. In connection with
28. The following passage is based on a number of interviews from Lindi, Mingoyo, and
Rwangwa, all in Lindi region, in 2000 and 2003. The most important interviews were:
Ibrahim Nassoro Kimbega, Rwangwa-Mchangani, 7 September 2003; Hassan Mchoya,
Rwangwa-Nachingwea, 31 October 2003; Issa Makolela, Rwangwa-Likangara, 3 September
2003; Issa Mapua, Rwangwa-Kilimahewa, 2 November 2003; Omari Salum Njalimbo,
Rwangwa-Dodoma, 10 October 2003.
29. Generally on this period and the display of political and rhetorical skills delivered by
Nyerere, see John Iliffe, ‘Breaking the chain of imperialism at its weakest link’ in James
Giblin and Gregory Maddox (eds), In Search of a Nation: Histories of authority and dissidence
in Tanzania (James Currey, Oxford, 2005) pp. 168–97; Susan Geiger, TANU Women:
Gender and culture in the making of Tanzanian nationalism, 1955–65 (Heinemann,
Portsmouth, NH, 1997).
30. Geiger, TANU Women; Felicitas Becker, Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), Chapter 7. For the politics of this region in the
run-up to independence more broadly, see Gus Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political
Development in Tanzania (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1971).
31. Interview, Ibrahim Nassoro Kimbega, Rwangwa-Mchangani, 7 September 2003.
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villagization, with their vital interests at stake, villagers remembered
judging Nyerere as pragmatically and mistrustfully as they would have a
colonial authority ﬁgure. Discussing the announcement that villagization
had been made compulsory, one villager recalled that they doubted
Nyerere’s ability to do as he said he would. ‘[We thought] maybe he is a
liar,’ was the phrase he used, suggesting a suspicion of large-scale political
bluff.32 This hope, of course, turned out to be unfounded: villagers
recalled a good deal of force involved in the actual move, signiﬁcant loss
of property, and much confusion about their entitlements in the new loca-
tions. They also recalled the shortage of basic necessities that resulted,
particularly with regard to clothing, and they identiﬁed these problems
closely with Nyerere, while attributing the ‘return’ of proper clothing to
his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi.33 There is a sense in these narratives
that Nyerere had his chance to improve villagers’ lot, and wasted it. One
respondent went so far as to characterize the measures taken under
Nyerere’s reign as ukatili, ‘cruelty’.34
This is not to say that the image of Nyerere ofﬁcially extolled in
October 1999 was absent among these interviewees. Villagers did praise
Tanzania’s peace and stability and occasionally identiﬁed it as a
Nyererean heritage. Moreover, it was noticeable that a somewhat exces-
sive number of male informants born early in the inter-war period (but
typically unsure of their exact date of birth) claimed to have been born in
1922, the year of Nyerere’s birth (as widely publicized at the time of his
death). If it is true that imitation is the sincerest form of ﬂattery, this can
be taken as a compliment these men paid their deceased President. Put
differently, they did implicitly endorse Nyerere as a ‘model patriarch’ by
seeking to be like him.
Yet rural respondents also made claims about Nyerere that are not so
much praising or damning, as just attempts to make sense of the man
in his time, with reference to the respondents’ own priorities. One even
32. Interview, Omari Salum Njalimbo, Rwangwa-Dodoma 10 October 2003. The infor-
mant’s insistence, nearly universal among his peers, that while many people were forced to
move he was not one of them, indicates that having arrived as a victim of forced removal may
affect a person’s status or entitlements even in the present. But ‘villagizees’ could also assert
a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂuence over local micro-politics, thanks to the electoral elements in
the constitution of ujamaa villages. In Rwangwa, it was widely acknowledged that Issa
Makolela had been voted out of his local party ofﬁce shortly after villagization. See also
Achim von Oppen, ‘Villages beyond ujamaa: land conﬂict and ecology in western Handeni’
in Doris Schmied (ed.), Changing Rural Structures in Tanzania (LIT Verlag, Münster, 1996),
pp. 85–106; Donald Vaughn Hassett, Economic Organisation and Political Change in a Village
of South East Tanzania (University of Cambridge, unpublished PhD thesis, 1984).
33. Elaborated by Issa Makolela, and Hassan Mchoya in the above-mentioned interviews;
Hyden also discusses this crisis in Beyond Ujamaa.
34. For the denigration of ‘idle’ urban youth, not only during villagization, see Andrew
Ivaska, Cultured States: Youth, gender and modern styles in 1960s Dar es Salaam (Duke
University Press, Durham, NC, 2011).
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made Nyerere the patron of policies he rejected, such as active discrimin-
ation against South Asians.35 Overall, these reminiscences amount in part
to quite plain stories of political experimentation and eventual failure.
The kind of lionization that occurs in Nyerere’s funeral songs is conspicu-
ous by its absence. Nor do villagers paint Nyerere as a patron or patriarch;
there is a sense of his having been, once in power, quite distant. This his-
torical Nyerere is much less rhetorically useful than the ofﬁcial version,
and is better described as the product of an effort to make sense of a
history of post-colonial failures.
A different pattern of dissent was produced by the younger, entrepre-
neurial generation that has little time for the moralist execration of ‘self-
seeking’ proﬁt-oriented business that was part of Nyererean rhetoric. While
Nyerere was lying in state, a businessman – perhaps forty years old, in an
impeccable suit – joined my table at a central Dar es Salaam restaurant.
His aim, it turned out, was to obtain more information about Nyerere’s
medical treatment in Europe. What he wanted to hear was that the hospital
where Nyerere had died was private, and expensive. Knowing St Thomas’s
hospital to be an NHS facility, I contradicted him, although I had won-
dered, considering that Nyerere had no known immigration status in
Britain, whether his country or the former colonial ‘mother country’ was
paying for his treatment. My interlocutor remained sceptical. Identifying
himself as an entrepreneur, and from an ethnic group he characterized as
well-travelled and full of business sense (the Manyema), he insisted that it
was impossible for a man like Nyerere to have relied on public facilities.
The man’s demeanour, appearance, and opinions identiﬁed him as one
of a growing stratum of African businessmen who have no time for the
communalist rhetoric and criticism of capitalism that Nyerere is known
for. He was one of many in his and subsequent age groups that dream of
going abroad to do business degrees, rather than to study agricultural or
construction engineering like an earlier generation. They endorse wealth
creation through private enterprise, rather than state-directed collective
effort in agricultural and infrastructure projects, as the path to progress,
and could be called the ‘post-SAP’ or ‘IMF’ generation.36 As Michael
Mwakilasa’s example shows, they do not therefore have to be either critic-
al of or fully independent from government, but their memories of
Nyerere reveal that they often hold divergent opinions that are not readily
traceable in the media.
35. Interview, Omari Salim Njalimbo.
36. See Ellis, Season of Rains; for rural manifestations of the rush into business, see the work
of the DARE project on de-agrarianization and rural employment, in particular Deborah
Bryceson, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa betwixt and between: rural livelihood practices and policies’
(ASC Working Papers 43, Leiden, 1999), available online at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/
bitstream/handle/1887/12912/ASC-075287668-022-01.pdf?sequence=2> (11 January 2013).
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This businessman’s suggestion that Nyerere himself had gone for
private treatment implied that the old leader himself no longer took the
communalist rhetoric of progress that had been characteristic of ujamaa
seriously. My interlocutor expressed a cynicism – representative of some
Tanzanians’ assessment of the state of their country – that converges with
well-known Western media coverage about African politics, which tends
to see politicians as only ever working for their own advantage, with the
rest of the citizenry forced to be equally self-interested if they are to
escape the poverty in which politicians’ actions trap them. Another ex-
pression of this more cynical current at the time of Nyerere’s death was
speculation about the wealth that his family might have amassed, and how
it would now be divided. I encountered it both in ‘my’ household and in
the street.
From the time of Nyerere’s death, then, Tanzanians with very different
backgrounds retained memories and elaborated views of Nyerere the pol-
itician that were strongly at variance with the ofﬁcial paradigm of the
‘father of the nation’. It would, of course, have been difﬁcult for CCM to
shut down such personal views and recollections. It was also unnecessary
so long as the holders of these views did not publicly assert them.
Nevertheless, these counter-narratives offer a glimpse of the diversity of
political experiences and attitudes in Tanzania that voters’ habit of
backing the CCM at election time obscures.
Competing uses of the ofﬁcial paradigm
There has also been a great deal of variation in the way in which endorse-
ments of Nyerere’s ofﬁcial memory have been deployed, indicating further
layers of political diversity and disagreement. On one hand, the way
Nyerere’s name has come up in government rhetoric in recent years
makes it clear that the effort to use him to legitimize CCM rule continues.
Both Benjamin Mkapa, President at the time of his death, and Mkapa’s
successor Jakaya Kikwete have explicitly invoked his heritage, the latter
claiming to build his presidency on ‘Nyerere’s values’.37 Even the Ugandan
President Yoweri Museveni, who began his career as a guerrilla ﬁghter, has
been quoted as endorsing the ofﬁcial Nyerere in the company of Tanzanian
politicians, describing him as ‘blessed with extraordinary wisdom and
compassion for the oppressed’.38 In 2004, the commemoration of Nyerere
37. Southern African News Features, 21 December 2005, ‘Tanzania: President Kikwete to
build on Nyerere values and Mkapa economics’, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200512210002.
html> (23 August 2011).
38. The New Sudan Vision, 2 June 2009, ‘Tanzania: Nyerere ﬁt to be a saint – Museveni’.
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was enshrined in law.39 The party’s college for further education and pol-
itical studies in Dar es Salaam has been renamed the ‘Nyerere Academy’.
In 2008, nine years after Nyerere’s death, CCM ofﬁcials chose to hold a
national meeting at Butiaba, Nyerere’s home village and burial site; in
2009 Mwakilasa’s pamphlet on Nyerere’s funeral was re-issued.40
On the other hand, there is also political criticism that takes place
within the ‘Nyerere as patron [of the poor; of Tanzania]’ paradigm. A
couple of years after Nyerere’s death, a group of striking workers, in the
course of a dispute over the privatization of their company, occupied their
manager’s ofﬁce singing songs in praise of Nyerere.41 In the last general
election campaign in October 2010, the leader of Chama cha Demokrasia
na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), one of the largest opposition parties,
invoked Nyerere against what he characterized as the incumbent’s
attempts to attract votes with promises of material rewards. He also
accused Kikwete of lacking commitment to ensuring that the country’s
resources were used in the interest of its people – deploying a classic
Nyerere policy of economic nationalism to critique the CCM.42 These
actions make it clear that the proposition of Nyerere, champion of the
downtrodden, leaves open the question of who the poor have to be
defended against: the ofﬁcial interpretation of Nyerere can be turned
against CCM grandees.
The continuing utility of Nyerere for government critics is observable
in the pages of the independent weekly newspaper Raia Mwema (‘Good
Citizen’), published since 2007. Photographs and quotations of Nyerere
show up in this periodical at least once a month. In the issue published
on 5 December 2007 a photo of Nyerere with the title: ‘The ﬁrst chair-
man of CCM, Mwalimu Nyerere, was a great defender of the rights of the
weakest’ (‘Mtetezi mkubwa wa haki kwa wanyonge’) accompanied an
article criticizing CCM’s current generation of leaders for paying insufﬁ-
cient attention to the wanyonge. In the 26 March 2008 issue, to comple-
ment the CCM’s meeting in Butiaba, a headline declared that ‘Even in
his grave, Nyerere still pities us Tanzanians [if the party does not take
steps on high-level corruption]’. The 6 October 2010 issue accompanied
an opinion piece with a quotation by Nyerere condemning wealth
acquired by theft of common goods.
39. United Republic of Tanzania, The Founders of the Nation (Honoring Procedures) Act,
2004 (Tanzania Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 2005).
40. Raia Mwema, 26 March–1 April 2008.
41. Timothy Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in mainland
Tanzania’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 41, 2 (2003), pp. 55–82.
42. Raia Mwema, ‘Slaa uses Nyerere to ﬁnish off Kikwete’ [‘Slaa amtumia Nyerere kumma-
liza Kikwete’], 6–12 October 2012, pp. 1, 3.
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Many of the mentions of Nyerere are connected to what Tanzanians
have come to call uﬁsadi, ‘high-level corruption’, reiterating his role as a
paragon of virtue in public ofﬁce.43 The type of concerns that Nyerere is
evoked to address are well summarized in a cartoon published in another
independent weekly paper, Mwana Halisi (‘The genuine child’) in May
2012. A barefoot, ragged ﬁgure representing Tanzania kneels at Nyerere’s
grave, saying ‘Those to whom you have left the task of looking after me
have been ﬁlled with the spirit of wanting things. They no longer care
about humanity; they care about objects’ (Figure 2).
This sentiment is widely expressed in present-day Tanzania, as
Swahili-speaking visitors to the country will recognize. It corresponds to
the mistrust lavished on the wealthy in popular discourse. In recent years,
it has been elaborated in the context of the moral anxieties surrounding
the slayings of albinos for medicine that proliferated in the late 2000s.
Perpetrators, experts, and ordinary observers agreed that the use of these
medicines was to obtain wealth, especially through gold digging.44
Elsewhere in the country, the 2000s saw renewed anxieties over allega-
tions that some newly wealthy Tanzanians had transformed the recently
deceased into zombies – undead quasi-slaves – through witchcraft. These
Figure 2. Cartoon from the weekly newspaper Mwana Halisi, May 2012
(see main text for translation). With permission of the publisher.
43. This term has come into its own in the last decade. It establishes corruption in high
places as distinct from rushwa, corruption in general.
44. See BBC News Online, ‘Tanzania fear over albino killing’, 17 December 2007, <http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7148673.stm> (23 August 2012).
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rumours offered an unﬂattering explanation for the wealth of those who, in
the minds of their neighbours, had not deserved their good fortune.45 Four
years after Nyerere’s death, one of the most popular pop songs in Tanzania
in summer 2003 started with the line ‘Machozi ya mnyonge, malipo kwa
mungu’: ‘The tears of the downtrodden have their payment with God’.46 It
was widely thought to refer to the performers’ trouble with immigration
authorities, casting these ofﬁcials in the role of oppressors.
Nevertheless, the widespread criticism of uﬁsadi and rampant material-
ism in the political class takes on a slightly paradoxical character when
one considers that the Tanzanian state remains the main purveyor of
essential services in infrastructure, health and education, and the main
focus of requests for assistance with developmental or self-help projects.47
That this is taken for granted is evident in the cartoon just discussed,
where the pauper who represents Tanzania describes the errant ofﬁcials as
charged with ‘looking after’ her or him. The state continues to ascribe to
itself a leading role in development, even if in keeping with international
pro-private-sector orthodoxies it casts itself in the role of the ‘enabler’
rather than planner. Jakaya Kikwete, the current President, came to
power on the slogan ‘Maisha bora kwa wote’, ‘A better life for everyone’,
and the words continue to be quoted, if often by way of complaint. If the
state is a poor patron, it nevertheless remains the go-to one for many
Tanzanians.
In a way, then, the persistence of Nyerere’s inﬂuence in Tanzanian pol-
itical discourse is rooted in the dilemmas faced by a government and citi-
zenry who need each other; who have expectations of each other but
struggle to have them met. So far as the government is concerned, percep-
tive observers of popular politics in Tanzania over the years have come
away with the conclusion that – with the exception of the period of villa-
gization – politicians put a signiﬁcant amount of effort into consensus
building.48 After all, political quiescence has never been total; violent
incidents of protest have occurred sporadically throughout Tanzania’s
post-colonial history. During villagization, a villager killed an overbearing
45. On witchcraft fears as a critique of iniquitous wealth, see Henrietta Moore and Todd
Saunders, Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, witchcraft and the occult in post-
colonial Africa (Routledge, London, 2001).
46. Baba (father), in these colloquial rhymes serves as a familiar and friendly way of
addressing a male listener, not necessarily much older than the speaker.
47. On the ofﬁcial role of the government in development planning see also Africa
Development Bank/Africa Development Fund, ‘United Republic of Tanzania: country strat-
egy paper 2011–15’ (Africa Development Bank, Tunis-Belvedère, June 2011).
48. For the period to 1978 see John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1979); for the period leading up to villagization see Michael
Jennings, ‘We must walk while others run: popular participation and development crisis in
Tanzania, 1961–69’, Journal of Modern African Studies 41, 2 (2003), pp. 163–87, for the in-
dependence era see Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa.
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ofﬁcial.49 In the last two decades, there have been occasional violent con-
frontations with authorities in the countryside, especially over their inter-
ference with witchcraft cleansing and over taxation.50 Aili Mari Tripp
likewise demonstrates the salience of small-scale dissent and negotiation
in the urban environment, with recurring confrontations over licensing,
transport, and taxation.51
While this clashes with images of African politics as unabashedly au-
thoritarian, it is not really surprising. Otherwise marginal people matter as
producers and taxpayers, and the most effective way for them to frustrate
ofﬁcials involves tax evasion and refusal to grow the cash crops earmarked
for government-controlled marketing. Both of these strategies of non-
compliance have been an ongoing headache for post-colonial govern-
ments as for their colonial predecessors.52 As regards cash cropping, pea-
sants respond to the state’s manipulation of producer prices by shifting
from cash crops destined for marketing boards and world markets to
much less tightly controlled production of foodstuffs for Tanzanian urban
markets.53 Against this background, the ofﬁcial Nyerere appears as part of
an ongoing effort to avoid conﬂict and cultivate consensus. Under-
resourced as it is, the state tries to pre-empt confrontations rather than
win them, and uses persuasion as an alternative to outright ‘buying’ of
consent through provision of services.
For non-elite Tanzanians, in turn, the ‘the state won’t help us/let’s ask
the state for help’ trope reﬂects their unpredictable experiences with
public services and the various levels of government they encounter. That
this ambivalence is of long standing can be observed by consulting
Tripp’s account of the conﬂicting attitudes of different arms of govern-
ment to the licensing of petty trading and the so-called ‘development
levy’ in the 1980s and 1990s. While party militia harassed petty traders,
its ‘ten-cell leaders’, the lowest level of the party leadership, often sym-
pathized with them. Whether your stall was demolished or survived, then,
depended partly on who got there ﬁrst.54 Yet the very name of the hated
tax symbolized the government’s insistence that it would play a leading
role in the development of the country.
Similarly, throughout the 2000s, the ongoing ‘Local Government
Reform Programme’ made a series of promises concerning the accessibility,
49. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, p. 102.
50. Tim Kelsall, ‘Governance, local politics and districtization in Tanzania: the 1998
Arumeru tax revolt’, African Affairs 99, 397 (2000), pp. 533–51; Stacey Langwick, Devils and
Development (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, unpublished PhD thesis, 2001).
51. Tripp, Changing the Rules, Chapter 6.
52. Andrew Burton, ‘The eye of authority: “native” taxation, colonial governance and re-
sistance in inter-war Tanganyika’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 1 (2008) pp. 74–94.
53. Hassett, ‘Economic organisation’.
54. Tripp, Changing the Rules, Chapter 6.
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responsiveness, and transparency of local government, and encouraged
reporting of small-scale corruption (rushwa).55 Through the serikali ya
mitaa (‘town quarter government’) and serikali ya kijiji (‘village govern-
ment’), the state is indeed close to its citizens.56 By the same token, local
government ofﬁcials are themselves members of local networks. They may
have vested interests in local conﬂicts over resources such as land, are sus-
ceptible to pressure from local communities, and even where they act
according to disinterested judgment, may not be seen to be doing so by
others. Thus some complaints of malpractice are spurious, some serious,
and which ones get heard depends very much on who makes them and to
whom.57 But it is at least possible to try and get local government to
respond.
Meanwhile, as Claire Mercer has shown, the Tanzanian government
has done a very good job of appearing consultative in the implementation
of the economic ‘advice’ on poverty reduction proffered by its internation-
al donors.58 In the process, it again made noises about its continuing role
in poverty reduction, while some of the more articulate ‘civil society
organizations’ consulted have asserted that the actual consultations,
via workshops, were desultory. Moreover, the surfeit of overlapping
poverty-reduction plans they produced was more distracting than inform-
ative, as the government ultimately just picked its preferred version with
an eye to the international reaction rather than that of internal ‘stake-
holders’. In this case, the government succeeded in persuading inter-
national observers of its good intentions despite internal criticism.
A scandal that erupted in the middle of 2012, meanwhile, illustrates the
lack of predictability in the ﬁeld of civil liberties rather than service provi-
sion, though ultimately salaries were at stake. On 25 June, the leader of a
doctors’ strike at the National Hospital in Dar es Salaam, Dr Ulimboka,
was abducted. He was severely beaten, had his teeth and nails pulled out,
and was dumped in a forest near the capital. When he was found, surpris-
ingly still alive, the government ﬂew him to South Africa for medical
treatment at public expense; the President went on TV to condemn the
55. United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, Local Government Reform
Programme II (Decentralisation by Devolution): Vision, goals and strategy, July 2009–June 2014
(Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 2009).
56. These local government institutions arguably constitute an under-researched legacy of
ujamaa and villagization; see also footnote 26. For a rare exception see Elke Grawert,
Departures From Post-Colonial Authoritarianism (Peter Lang Verlag, Berlin, 2009).
57. Felicitas Becker, ‘“Bad governance” and the persistence of alternative political arenas:
a study of a Tanzanian region’ in Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (eds), The
Governance of Daily Life in Africa (Brill, Leiden, 2009), pp. 73-100.
58. Claire Mercer, ‘Performing partnership: civil society and the illusions of good govern-
ance in Tanzania’, Political Geography 22, 7 (2003), pp. 741–63.
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incident and assert that the government was not in the business of torture
and intimidation.59
A month later, the paper Mwana Halisi published an article with
detailed evidence from telephone records and from the victim, alleging
that the abduction was the work of a security ofﬁcial working out of State
House. At the same time, it rubbished the case against a Kenyan said by
the police to have confessed to the crime, quoting the pastor to whom he
was supposed to have confessed as saying no such thing had happened.60
The government’s reaction was to shut down Mwana Halisi and put
the incriminated security ofﬁcer in a ‘safe location’. Several other papers,
including Raia Mwema, strongly condemned its closure and stayed
open.61 Meanwhile, the government opposed a teachers’ strike then
ongoing in court, but its leaders remained safe.
If Mwana Halisi was right (and its account is certainly more plausible
than the idea of a lone Kenyan assailant) the attack on Ulimboka stands
out as an ultimately demonstrative, rather than irrational, spike in violence
by a government that otherwise stuck to more legalistic methods of
repression. Mwana Halisi’s punishment, again, appears symbolic, though
it is not clear from the vociferous response of the press if the message
came across.62 Unsurprisingly, one point made in the media in connec-
tion with this scandal is that the current leadership’s failure to prevent
Dr Ulimboka’s abduction falls short of the example set by Nyerere.
Indeed, they quoted the victim’s father to this effect.63
On one hand, this invocation of Nyerere appears formulaic: the found-
ing President seems to get dragged into most political disagreements.
On the other, although it is contested, the ‘ofﬁcial’ take on Nyerere never-
theless serves to afﬁrm shared principles in the political arena, as all sides
roughly agree on what virtues he stood for, while disagreeing on who em-
bodies them in the present. The inﬂuence that these principles have held
59. An image of Ulimboka before receiving treatment can be found at <http://sophiakessy.
blogspot.co.uk/2012_06_01_archive.html> (25 December 2012). For the government’s
denial of a role in his torture, see BBC News Online, ‘Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete denies
Steven Ulimboka “torture”’, 2 July 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
18671315> (10 September 2012) and the Mwana Halisi article discussed below.
60. At the time of writing, the article was still available online: Mwana Halisi, ‘Aliyemteka
ulimboka huyo hapa’, 25 July 2012, <http://www.mwanahalisi.co.tz/node/2968> (5
September 2012).
61. See Raia Mwema, 1 August 2012, front page and p. 4; Sani, 28 July 2012, front page,
and Mseto (normally a sports paper), 1 August 2012 (all bought and read in Dar es Salaam).
62. It is also worth noting that if security ofﬁcials operating out of State House acted
without the President’s knowledge, this indicates behind-the-scenes disunity on the forms of
repression to use against strikers, and an uncertain future for workers’ rights and civil liber-
ties depending on who wins the debate.
63. Mwananchi (‘Citizen’), ‘Baba yake Dk Ulimboka atoa ya moyoni’, 3 September 2012,
<http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/49-uchaguzi-mkuu/26041-baba-yake-dk-ulimboka-atoa-
ya-moyoni> (10 September 2012).
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and will hold over the actions of those in power is debatable, but at the
very least politicians have to work around them and, as with Ulimboka,
risk being shown up as hypocrites. Again, that will be small consolation
for victims of repression. But the diverse uses of Nyerere make a prism
that helps distinguish important shades and nuances in what might other-
wise appear to be a monochrome support base for the ruling party.
Moreover, it suggests that the CCM’s hold on power has been harder
won, and is more contingent, than is immediately evident.
Conclusion
The challenges to and divergent uses of Nyerere’s ofﬁcial image trace out
greater liveliness and diversity in Tanzania’s political discourse than
CCM’s towering electoral dominance suggests. Villagers’ memories retain
Nyerere the autocrat and some entrepreneurs who are distant from gov-
ernment construe him as corrupt. But even among people who agree on
his status as a benign patriarch, the government has not succeeded in
shutting down dissent; rather, the ‘ofﬁcial’ Nyerere constantly serves to
hold government to its promises. Too poor and dependent on inter-
national donors’ goodwill to sustain repression even if they preferred to,
the CCM’s grandees turn to repression and consensus building in turn.
The outcome is a contradictory, hence unpredictable, yet viable political
practice that could be characterized as ‘consultative authoritarianism’.
Tanzanians’ criticisms of their government, as expressed with reference
to Nyerere, are clearly reminiscent of the concepts of ‘economy of affec-
tion’ or ‘moral economy’ that have been used to interpret longstanding
political reasoning in East Africa. They also sit well with the concept of
the ‘zero-sum universe’, where one person gets richer only by making
others poorer, that has been described as characteristic of peasants’ world
views.64 Yet rather than the bewilderment of people who try to explain
their disappointed expectations in anachronistic political categories, the
discussion of the failings of the state, which the image of Nyerere helps to
focus, expresses current experiences and struggles. Ofﬁcial rhetoric itself
constantly draws on the ‘idiom of kinship’ with reference to Nyerere, but
cannot thereby shut down dissent, and the invocation of kinship mingles
freely with good government-type donor speak.
The situation is faintly reminiscent of what Jonathon Glassman has
described for late pre-colonial towns on the Swahili coast. Then, both
patricians and plebeians used the same language of Arabicate civilization
and patronage to make claims about entitlement and belonging, but
64. Ralph Austen, ‘The moral economy of witchcraft’ in John and Jean Comaroff (eds),
Modernity and its Malcontents (Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL, 1993), pp. 89–110.
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fought over the deﬁnition of its terms and the mutual obligations of
patron and client.65 Now, again, there is a lot of overlap in what govern-
ment agents and their critics say the state should be doing, but disagree-
ment over how and to what extent these obligations are fulﬁlled. Like
references to coastal civilization, then, the evocation of Nyerere as a refer-
ence point in political conversation can imply very different things for dif-
ferent speakers and listeners, even if the terms of praise are almost
identical. His memory continues to elicit contradictory assessments and
expectations of the Tanzanian state, whose coexistence reﬂects a real
mixture of strength and weakness.
There are, moreover, also quite different ways of deriving the claims
pegged on Nyerere, and the ways they are made, by examining the struc-
ture and practices of formal, parliamentary, and government politics.
First, the ability of the CCM apparatus to limit and manage internal com-
petition and conﬂict has been commented on since the early independ-
ence period.66 Though it remains to be fully understood, it is explained
partly by the rules of party and government that mean local ofﬁcials are
often deployed beyond their area of origin and shifted regularly, limiting
their ability to build regional power bases. The relative economic weak-
ness of many regions also contributes to keeping the central seats of
power in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma the dominant arenas of political
competition.
The ‘unevenness’ of the Tanzanian state over both small and large dis-
tances, moreover, need not be seen as a sign simply of weakness. Rather,
it can be said to represent the outcome of efforts to manage this weakness.
Catherine Boone has demonstrated that separate political compromises
with different regions have remained an essential political stratagem for
independent African states.67 At a local level, the lack of impartiality and
predictability among agents of the state is the ﬂip side of central govern-
ment success in recruiting representatives from among existing local net-
works, even if these agents then alternate somewhat awkwardly between
being ‘of the government’ and being ‘of the village/quarter’. If Nyerere
serves as a re-fashioned ‘big man’, he also represents a rather modern
tradition.
Finally, the different discursive incarnations of Nyerere in contemporary
Tanzania offer a fresh perspective also on a phenomenon that has some-
times vexed observers of the country: the persistence of ‘Nyerere-philia’ in
both the Tanzanian and the academic public. In part, it can be put down
65. Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, rebellion and popular consciousness on the
Swahili coast, 1856–88 (James Currey, Oxford, 1995).
66. Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party transformation and economic development (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967), Chapter 3, especially p. 80.
67. Boone, Political Typographies.
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to the success of Nyerere’s propaganda, not only about himself but also
about the sort of society (egalitarian and protective of the weak) that he
wanted Tanzania to be.68 Yet lionizations of Nyerere survive so well,
arguably, also because for the Tanzanian public (and perhaps also for aca-
demics) they are not simply or even predominantly about Nyerere.69
Rather, Nyerere serves as a reference point for debates over participation,
privilege, and entitlement. Much of the fondness for Nyerere in Tanzania
is genuine, but it is so precisely because it is not simply about the man,
but about what he can be made to stand for.
68. See Jim Brennan, ‘Blood enemies: exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist
political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75’, Journal of African History 47, 3 (2006), pp. 389–
413, for the Nyererean discourse on protection against international exploitation.
69. For an example of some academics’ exasperation with Nyerere-philia, see Justin
Willis’s review of Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari’s Mwalimu: The inﬂuence of Nyerere
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 1995), in African Affairs 95, 380 (1996), pp. 465–66.
Western, and not only academic, observers also use Nyerere as a proxy for debates about the
kind of moderate left-wing idealism he (or his policies) represented. See Michael Jennings,
‘Almost an Oxfam in itself: Oxfam, ujamaa and development in Tanzania in the 1960s and
70s’, African Affairs 101, 405 (2002), pp. 509–30.
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